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Abstract—
As the Internet of Things grows to large scale, its
components will increasingly be controlled by self-
interested agents. For example, sensor networks will
evolve to community sensing where a community of
agents combine their data into a single coherent struc-
ture. As there is no central quality control, agents need
to be incentivized to provide accurate measurements.
We propose game-theoretic mechanisms that provide
such incentives and show their application on the
example of community sensing for monitoring air
pollution. These mechanisms can be applied to most
sensing scenarios and allow the Internet of Things to
grow to much larger scale than currently exists.
I. INTRODUCTION
With increasing progress of sensing and networking tech-
nology, it is now possible to deploy dense networks of low-
cost sensors that measure qualities of the environment, such
as air pollution, noise, radiation or spectrum use. Progress in
nanotechnology in particular allows complex sensing equip-
ment to be replaced by solid-state electronic sensors that can
operate continuously and are available at low cost. The sensors
will extend the notion of the Internet of Things beyond simple
location measurements.
Even though existing ﬁnite-volume physical models are
capable of producing rough pollution estimates of large areas
without any measurements, sensor data will be most useful
when it can be integrated into a joint data-driven model
that can produce a detailed street-level pollution map to be
shared by many users. For the purpose of minimizing street-
level pollution exposure, we need a dense network of many
sensors that are spread over different locations. Many of
these locations will be owned by private individuals, and
it would be most practical if these individuals themselves
installed, maintained and operated the sensors. This is the
idea of community sensing, where sensors are controlled by
different agents and their results integrated in an open sensor
network [7], [1].
We are involved in a project that explores community
sensing for measuring air quality using both ﬁxed and mobile
sensors. Examples are shown in Figure 1. Initial experiments
with such sensors suggests that air quality varies signiﬁcantly
Fig. 1. Air quality sensors that could be used in community sensing. Top
left: on top of a bus; bottom left: on top of a tram; top right: attached to a
solar-powered weather station on a building; and bottom right: attached to a
smartphone.
throughout a city, and thus it would be very useful to maintain
accurate maps that allow people to reduce their exposure to
harmful pollution.
Community sensing will allow much larger and comprehen-
sive sensor networks than can currently be imagined, and will
be an important next step for the Internet of Things. However,
ensuring that the data obtained is of sufﬁcient quality is a
signiﬁcant challenge ([1]). As there are many individual and
self-interested participants, it is not possible to control the
network through a central authority. Instead, participants need
to be given incentives that will make them cooperate with the
sensor network in the best possible way. This is the topic of
this paper.
The most straightforward way to incentivize accurate mea-
surements is by payments that compensate for the effort of
providing measurements. However, sometimes agents may
have strong incentives to report incorrect values, for example
to hide pollution they caused themselves, and small monetary
incentives would fail to compensate for them. In such a case,
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the incentives can be used as a reputation so that agents that
fail to consistently gather rewards loose their credibility. The
mechanisms we consider can also be used to as part of such
a reputation system.
This paper is structured as follows. First, we deﬁne the
setting and assumptions behind our mechanism. Following a
review of game-theoretic mechanisms for incentivizing truthful
information revelation, we deﬁne the novel mechanism we
propose for community sensing, called Peer Truth Serum, and
discuss its properties. Finally, we illustrate the mechanisms on
an example.
II. THE SETTING
We assume that there is an open group of agents distributed
in space that take measurements of a continuous space-time
physical process, such as air pollution levels in a city over the
course of a day. While typically we measure several different
quantities, for the purpose of this paper we assume that a
single quantity called pollution is measured, and that at any
given location l and time t, there are N possible pollution
levels denoted as V = {v1, . . . , vN}.
Agents report each observation o as a report s to a center
that they trust to aggregate their reports. The center integrates
the reported data with the known emission and dispersion
characteristics in an environmental model to produce a pol-
lution map. The model uses a partition of the space into
different regions, with the assumption that pollution levels
within each region are relatively homogenous. For each region,
it has a prior expectation of pollution levels that is given
by known emission and meteorological information, such as
nearby chimneys, trafﬁc volumes and current wind ﬁeld. It
combines this expectation with reports for the region to pro-
duce a maximum-likelihood estimate. This estimate also takes
into account statistical correlation between regions. While the
details of such a complex environmental model are beyond the
scope of this paper (see for example [6] for more discussion),
we only need to know that the output of the model is a
pollution map represented as a full probability distribution over
the possible pollution levels at every location l. In this map, we
let Rl,t(v) denote the probability that the pollution at location
l and time t is of level v; Rl,t(v) > 0 for all v ∈ V .
The center updates the map periodically using the measure-
ment reports it received during the last time instant. Depending
on the frequency of reports, updates may happen as frequently
as every hour or as infrequently as once a week. Each agent
has private prior beliefs Prl,t(v) about the pollution levels
that the model will report at the next update, Rl,t+1. Before
measurement, these private beliefs will generally be close to
the current map Rt,l, but they can diverge signiﬁcantly after
the agent makes a measurement. We let Prl,t(v) be the belief
before measurement that the model will report Rl,t+1 = v
after the next update, and Prl,to be the belief after measuring
value o. In the following, we will always consider a single
location and time point only, and thus drop the l, t superscripts.
Figure 2 illustrates how an agent’s beliefs are inﬂuenced
by its observation. The curve labelled Pr(x) shows the prior
xa b c
Pr  (x)
Pr(x) Pr  (x)
a
c
Fig. 2. Probability distributions for a variable x.
probability distribution that the agent has about the value of
variable x before measuring it. It shows that b is believed to
be the most likely value. Once the agent measures the actual
value of the variable to be a or c, its belief changes to the
distribution Pra(x) or Prc(x), respectively. Note the inﬂuence
of the prior belief: when the agent has measured c, the most
likely value may not be c itself, but a value between c and b.
While in general the prior beliefs of agents can be expected
to be quite homogeneous and close to the public distribution
R, the way that beliefs are updated is likely to be very
different between agents. An agent who strongly believes
its own measurements is likely to change its beliefs more
dramatically, and thus obtain a signiﬁcantly different posterior
distribution. However, one assumption that is reasonable to
make is that an agent believes that its own measurement is
positively correlated with the measurements that other agents
will report, meaning that the measured value has the biggest
relative increase in probability:
Deﬁnition 1: An agent’s belief update from prior Pr to
posterior Prx after measuring x satisﬁes the rational update
property if and only if:
Prx(x)
Pr(x)
>
Prx(y)
Pr(y)
∀y = x (1)
If this property would not hold, agents do not believe that
they are measuring the same quantities that are modelled and
it makes no sense to compare or aggregate their measurements.
It is thus an assumption that we will make in this paper.
III. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS FOR OBTAINING TRUTHFUL
REPORTS
Rewarding agents to provide truthful reports of their private
information has been studied in game theory. In this section,
we review this earlier work. All schemes are based on the
fact that agents’ posterior beliefs change according to their
observation, as shown in the example in Figure 2. As agents
will compute the rewards they expect from a report using
this belief, the incentives can be scaled so that for each
observation, reporting the true observation gives the highest
expected reward given the associated posterior belief.
Different schemes can be used depending on whether the
goal is to get an agent to truthfully report its posterior
probability distribution or the value it has actually observed.
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We ﬁrst consider incentives to truthfully report the posterior
probability distribution.
A. Reporting the full posterior distribution
For problems such as weather prediction, where a true value
eventually becomes known, such incentives can be provided
by proper scoring rules [12]. Agents submit a probability
distribution p(x) on their best estimate of the value of the
variable x that is to be predicted. Once the true value x¯
becomes known, they get rewarded according to a scoring
rule applied to the probability p(x¯) they predicted for this
true value. Examples of proper scoring rules are:
• the logarithmic scoring rule:
pay(x¯, p) = a+ b · log p(x¯) (2)
• the quadrdatic scoring rule:
pay(x¯, p) = a+ b
(
2p(x¯)−
∑
v
p(v)2
)
(3)
It is also possible to use scoring rules to elicit averages,
maxima and other functions of a set of measurements, see
[5] for a complete characterization of the possibilities offered
by scoring rules.
However, in pollution sensing, it is generally not possible to
ever know the ground truth as required by scoring rule. Peer
prediction [8] is a technique for this setting. The principle is
to consider the reports of other agents that observed the same
variable, or at least a stochastically relevant variable, as the
missing ground truth. A proper scoring rule is then used for
the incentives. Provided that other agents truthfully report an
unbiased observation of the variable, such a reward scheme
makes it a best response to provide truthful and unbiased re-
ports of the observations, and truthful reporting thus becomes
a Nash equilibrium. [8] describe such a mechanism and several
variants, and [3] discuss further optimizations and variants.
An important issue with implementing peer prediction
mechanisms is that agents should report both the value they
observed and the posterior probability distribution that re-
sulted: the value is needed in order to be able to score
other reports, while the distribution is needed to determine
a payment to the agent itself. In the approach originally
proposed by [8], the agents report a value and the center
replaces this by an assumed posterior distribution for agents
that have observed this value. The limitation of this approach
is the need to know agents posterior beliefs. The Bayesian
Truth Serum [10] is a mechanism that elicits both the prior
beliefs and the observation, but only applies when these are not
revealed to other agents, which is not the case in community
sensing.
To overcome this limitation, in [14] the authors provide a
mechanism where agents report both their prior and posterior
beliefs about the observed value. Noting that Bayesian updat-
ing implies that the ratio of posterior/prior is the highest for the
actually observed value (the rational update assumption), the
two reports together also determine the true value. However,
it is difﬁcult to apply this technique to community sensing
since we cannot enforce reporting the prior beliefs before an
observation.
Applying the peer prediction approach to our setting has the
challenge that sensors are taking measurements at different
locations, i.e. we do not have another sensor reading of
exactly the same value. However, the peer prediction method
as deﬁned by [8] only requires a stochastically relevant signal.
Similar to [13], we can obtain such a stochastically relevant
signal by using a pollution model applied to the combined set
of measurements reported by other agents.
Work by Papakonstantinou, Roger, Gerding and Jennings
investigated a multi-agent scenario where the center speciﬁes
the data wanted, and then incentivizes agents to provide that
data [9]. The approach combines a ﬁrst stage where the
center selects the agent that can provide the measurement
in the most cost-effective way with a second stage where
either the observation is scored against a true value that
becomes known later, or against another report using the peer
prediction principle. The approach assumes a pull approach
where the center decides what measurements are important
and speciﬁcally asks agents to report these.
B. Reporting only the measured value
In community sensing, reporting entire probability distribu-
tions is not desirable as it greatly increases the load on already
limited communication bandwidth. Therefore, it is desirable to
only transmit a report s of the measured value itself.
The most straightforward way is to let the center substitute
a standardized posterior distribution for each reported value,
and let the agent select the right distribution by reporting one
of the values. This was the approach originally adopted in the
peer prediction method ([8]).
In [3]), the peer prediction principle is implemented directly
without using scoring rules. Instead, for each combination
of report and reference report, minimal truthful payments
are computed directly using linear programming. It is shown
that these payments can often be much more efﬁcient than
those obtained by assuming posterior distributions and ap-
plying proper scoring rules, and satisfy other properties such
as resistance against collusion. However, they still require
assumptions about the posterior beliefs of the agents.
[16] investigates mechanisms that are robust to variations
of these beliefs, and shows that this is only possible in very
limited ways and leads to large increases in payments.
[2] proposes a mechanism for truthful opinion polls with
two possible values that requires no assumptions about poste-
rior distributions. While the mechanism is not always truthful,
it is helpful in the sense that non-truthful reports only help
to make the public poll outcome converge to the true dis-
tribution more rapidly. Thus, the mechanism is shown to be
asymptotically truthful in the sense that it converges to the
true distribution. [4] shows how to extend this mechanism to
settings with more than two values. The setting assumed in
their mechanism is very close to the pollution sensing problem:
the publicly available prior corresponds exactly to the pollution
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map. We will therefore adopt a very similar mechanism for our
problem.
IV. THE PEER TRUTH SERUM
We propose a new mechanism for incentivizing truthful
measurement reporting, which we call the Peer Truth Serum:
Deﬁnition 2: The Peer Truth Serum is a payment function
that rewards an agent for reporting a value s of a variable
that is compared against a reference estimate m for the
same variable, given a publicly available prior probability
distribution R for the variable. It rewards the agent according
to the payment function α+ β · τ(s,m,R):
• τ(s,m,R) = 1R(m) if s = m
• τ(s,m,R) = 0 otherwise.
where α and β > 0 are constants.
In our scenario, agent i measures the pollution level at location
l and time t, and reports the value s = sl,ti . The report is
evaluated against a reference value m = ml,t+1 from the
model, based on an update using other reports received in the
same time interval. The reward is computed using the known
public prior R = Rl,t.
As an example, consider a range of three values for the
pollution level: a(low), b(medium) and c(high), and let the
public prior for some l, t be:
x a b c
R(x) 0.2 0.6 0.2
Assume that the agent measures b, and truthfully reports this
value. The center obtains a reference report m = b and ﬁnds
that it matches the report of the agent. Letting α = 0 and
β = 1, the agent would be rewarded τ(s,m,R) = 5/3. The
agent might also report a, but it is less likely that a would
match the value reported by the model. However, if it does,
the agent would get the much higher reward of 5. Thus, we
can see that the payment scheme balances out the risk inherent
in reporting unlikely values.
In practice, an issue that might arise is that for very small R,
the payment can become unboundedly large. It will often be
desirable to impose a budget limit so that the payment cannot
exceed this limit.
While the likelihood of matching the reference report, and
thus obtaining a reward at all, is highest for reporting a very
common value, the amount of reward is highest for uncommon
values. Together these two inﬂuences make it optimal for an
agent to report its true measurement, as we will now show.
We ﬁrst consider a setting where all agents adopt the publicly
available map R as their prior distribution, and later consider
more informed agents.
A. Agents adopt the public prior distribution
Proposition 1: There exists a threshold  > 0 such that
when an agent’s prior distribution Pr(·) for a variable is within
 of the publicly available distribution R:
Pr(v) +  > R(v) > Pr(v)−  (4)
the Peer Truth Serum incentivizes truthful reporting.
Proof: We observe that an agent who observes o and
reports s expects a reward:
pay(o, s) = α+ β
∑
x
Pro(x)τ(s, x,R) = α+ βPro(s)
1
R(s)
In order for the mechanism to be truthful, we require that
for v = o, pay(o, o) ≥ pay(o, v), i.e.:
Pro(v)
R(v)
≤ Pro(o)
R(o)
⇔ R(v)
Pro(v)
≥ R(o)
Pro(o)
Given the assumption 4, this holds under the condition that:
Pr(v)− 
Pro(v)
≥ Pr(o) + 
Pro(o)
As Pro(o)Pr(o) >
Pro(v)
Pr(v) ∀o, v, let
δ(o, v) =
Pr(v)
Pro(v)
− Pr(o)
Pro(o)
> 0
then the truthfulness condition holds for any  such that:
(∀o, v)δ(o, v) ≥ 
Pro(o)
+

Pro(v)
As δ(o, v) > 0, such an  always exists and can be calculated
as:
 = minv,o,v =o
Pr(v)Pro(o)− Pr(o)Pro(v)
Pro(v) + Pro(o)
(5)
Thus, when agents adopt to public prior within some
tolerance , the mechanism incentivizes truthful reporting.
For the example given earlier, assume that an agent’s prior
and posterior beliefs are as follows:
x a b c
Pra(x) 0.6 0.3 0.1
Prb(x) 0.1 0.8 0.1
Prc(x) 0.1 0.3 0.6
Pr(x) 0.2 0.6 0.2
Now we can compute  according to Equation 5 as
min(1/3, 1/7, 1/9) = 1/9. Thus, for example, if the public
distribution R is within the bound of 1/9 from the agent prior:
x a b c
R(x) 0.25 0.5 0.25
depending on its observation o, the agent would expect the
following payments for its reports:
s a b c
o = a 2.4 0.6 0.4
o = b 0.4 1.6 0.4
o = c 0.4 0.6 2.4
and thus truthful reporting always gives the highest payoff.
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B. Agents do not adopt the public prior
In some cases, agents may be more informed than the public
model. For example, they may observe that there are trafﬁc
jams, ﬁres or other incidents that will cause the pollution level
to be higher than expected by the model. In this case, their
prior belief even before measurement could be considerably
different from the public map R.
If this means that the difference between R and the private
belief Pr is larger than the threshold , the agent may no
longer be incentivized to report truthfully. For example, given
the private beliefs as above, if R were as follows:
x a b c
R(x) 0.5 0.1 0.4
depending on its observation o, the agent would expect the
following payments:
s a b c
o = a 1.2 3 0.25
o = b 0.2 8 0.25
o = c 0.2 3 1.5
and thus report b no matter what the actual observation was.
While the fact that the report is not truthful may be
considered undesirable, note that in this example, reporting
b actually helps the public report R to converge more quickly
to the agent’s private belief than reporting truthfully.
This is interesting in particular if the agent’s private belief
is more informed than the public map, i.e. that it is closer to
the true value distribution:
Deﬁnition 3: An agent’s prior beliefs Pr[·] about a signal
with true distribution Q[·] are informed with respect to a public
prior R[·] if and only if for all v, either R[v] ≤ Pr[v] ≤ Q[v]
or R[v] ≥ Pr[v] ≥ Q[v].
In such a case, it would be most helpful to make the public
map R converge to the private beliefs as quickly as possible.
We are now going to show that the Peer Truth Serum incen-
tivizes helpful reports that drive the public map closer to the
true distribution without necessarily being truthful.
Thus, convergence happens in two steps:
1) ﬁrst the diverse private prior distributions and the pub-
lished pollution map converge to the same distribution,
establishing a common frame of reference, and
2) once this is established, the incentives are for truthful
reporting and both the public map and the private priors
converge asymptotically towards the true distribution.
Such a two-step process makes a lot of sense in community
sensing, since a sensor is usually present in the system for an
extended period of time and will only have to pass the initial
phase once when joining the network.
We ﬁrst show the following property of the Peer Truth
Serum:
Proposition 2: Provided the the rational update assump-
tion (1) holds and all agents prior beliefs are informed, using
the Peer Truth Serum no agent ever reports a non-truthful
answer s = b when according to its beliefs, the true answer a
is more under-represented in the current public prior R:
Pr(a)/R(a) > Pr(b)/R(b) ⇒ s(a) = b;
Proof: For the case where the agent believes the reference
report to be truthful, this follows directly from the rational
update assumption and the payment rule. After observing a,
the expected payments are for reporting a:
Pra(a)
R(a)
=
Pra(a)
Pr(a)
Pr(a)
R(a)
and for reporting b:
Pra(b)
R(b)
=
Pra(b)
Pr(b)
Pr(b)
R(b)
The ﬁrst term is greater for a than for b by the rational update
assumption, and the second term is greater for a than for b
by the condition of the proposition. Thus, the agent will not
report b instead of a.
For the case where the agent believes that the agent pro-
viding the reference report also misreports using an informed
prior, as it knows that this other agent will not report b instead
of a, misreporting b for a would only lower the probability of
matching reports and thus not be rational.
Thus, in all equilibria where agents have informed priors
and believe each other to have informed priors, the proposition
holds.
We now use this result to show the following:
Proposition 3: In the current distribution R, let A be the set
of underreported values (∀a ∈ A,R(a) < Pr(a)) and B the
set of overreported values (∀b ∈ B,R(b) ≥ Pr(b)). There will
never be a non-truthful report for some answer b ∈ B instead
of another answer a ∈ A. Thus, provided that the agent’s prior
beliefs are informed with respect to R and the true distribution,
the combined frequency of reports of values b ∈ B is not
greater than the agent’s believed frequency
∑
b∈B Pr(b).
Proof: For all a ∈ A, R(a)/Pr(a) < 1 whereas for
all b ∈ B, R(b)/Pr(b) ≥ 1. By Proposition 2, there are
never any reports of values in B when the true values were
in A. Thus, the combined frequency of all reports of values
in B cannot be larger than the true frequency
∑
b∈B Q(b).
By the assumption that the belief Pr is informed, we have∑
b∈B Q(b) ≤
∑
b∈B Pr(b) ≤
∑
b∈B R(b), and thus the
combined frequency is also not larger than
∑
b∈B Pr(b).
Now recall that the public statistic R is updated by averag-
ing the reports obtained from agents. Thus, we have:
Proposition 4: Within some ﬁnite amount of updates, for
all values of b ∈ B, the public statistic R(b) < Pr(b)+ , and
consequently for all values of a ∈ A, R(a) > Pr(a)− .
Proof: The frequency of values in B will be not larger
than what is believed by the agent, so R will gradually be
reduced to become arbitrarily close to Pr. Likewise, the
frequency of reports of values in A will be at least as large
as what the agent believes, and thus also become arbitrarily
close to Pr.
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Fig. 3. A spatial setting of four regions.
Thus, agents that have prior distributions that diverge from
the public prior in an informed way will provide helpful reports
that drive the public map close to its own beliefs.
When the private priors are not informed, such convergence
may still happen, but cannot be guaranteed. However, such a
case is not realistic: either an agent has background informa-
tion not accessible to the center, and in this case its beliefs
should be more informed, or otherwise it should believe the
distribution given by the center. Another issue is what happens
when agents have informed private prior distributions but they
differ signiﬁcantly.
Both cases are helped by the fact that rational agents
should gradually adapt their beliefs about the model output
to the published distribution R, and thus eventually converge
to a single distribution. However, such convergence may be
undesirably slow.
For the case where the private prior Pr is equal to the true
distribution Q, helpful reports actually speed up convergence
to the true map. This is because the untruthful reports are
always for values where R/Pr is lower than for the true
value, i.e. values where R should be increased more strongly
to approach Pr. Helpful reports can thus be more valuable
than truthful reports.
V. EXAMPLE
We consider the setting shown in Figure 3 where ﬁve
agents {S1, . . . , S5} are making air-quality measurements
in different locations. The center divides the area into four
regions: the side street on the east (R1), the main road on the
south (R2), the library, which is the region north of the main
street and east of the side street (R3) and the region south of
the main street (R4), and uses three possible pollution levels
V = {low,medium, high}.
We compare two different incentive schemes: peer predic-
tion as described in [8], [9] using the quadratic scoring rule:
pay(x¯, p) = 2p(x¯)−
∑
v
p(v)2
and the Peer Truth Serum mechanism we propose in this
paper. In the peer prediction mechanism, for each possible
value that an agent might report the center needs to deﬁne a
posterior distribution to assume. For this example, we assume
that the center derives an assumed probability distribution
Pˆ r
l,t
s for reported value s by taking the public map as the
prior distribution, increasing the probability for the reported
value by 50%, and then renormalizing the distribution:
Pˆ r
l,t
s (x) = 1.5R
l,t(x)/α if x = s, Rl,t(x)/α otherwise
with α chosen so that
∑
x Pˆ r
l,t
s (x) = 1. The difﬁculty with
peer prediction is that agents might not actually have this
posterior distribution, and this can cause failures as we will
see below.
We now illustrate the two incentive schemes on two example
measurements, one where both encourage a truthful report and
one where both encourage a non-truthful report. The incentives
that are computed can become a payment to reward the agent
for its effort, or they could be reputation that accumulates and
determines an agent’s inﬂuence on the public map.
A. Example of Truthful Reports
First, we look at the peak hour of t1 = 18:00 where
the public prior for the pollution level at the library (R3)
is published. At the same time, agent S3 has a private
prior distribution PrR3,t1 that is inﬂuenced by observing the
current weather and trafﬁc conditions, and therefore somewhat
different from the current map value.
low medium high
RR3,t1 0.1 0.5 0.4
PrR3,t1 0.15 0.7 0.15
The agent measures that the level is in fact medium, and
updates her belief to obtain the posterior belief PrR3,t1medium as
follows:
o low medium high
PrR3,t1medium 0.1 0.8 0.1
During the same time interval, the center also receives
reports of medium levels from S1 and S4, and high levels
from S2 and S5, and thus concluded that the pollution level
at the location of S3 is mR3,t1=medium. However, the agent
does not know anything about these measurements except
that it assumes them to be truthful, and so its best guess is
that mR3,t1 is drawn from the same distribution as its own
posterior.
1) Peer prediction with quadratic scoring rule: Using the
assumption about the agent’s posterior belief given above, the
center computes the following assumed posterior probability
distributions for each reported value s:
s low medium high
Pˆ r
R3,t1
low 0.14 0.48 0.38
Pˆ r
R3,t1
medium 0.08 0.6 0.32
Pˆ r
R3,t1
high 0.08 0.42 0.5
The agent can either obtain these distributions from the cen-
ter, or compute them itself using the public map RR3,t1 and the
6
??
?
?
56
rule the center uses to compute the assumed posterior. Using
its true posterior distribution, the agent can now compute the
expected reward when reporting the different values, given by
the probability that the reported value matches the model times
the reward that would result in that case:
s E[pay(s)]
low 0.1 · (2 · 0.14− 0.142 − 0.482 − 0.382) = −0.011
medium 0.8 · (2 · 0.6− 0.082 − 0.62 − 0.322) = 0.58
high 0.1 · (2 · 0.42− 0.082 − 0.422 − 0.52) = 0.056
and so it can expect the highest reward when truthfully
reporting medium.
2) Peer Truth Serum: As above, upon measuring a level
of medium the agent updates its belief and can compute its
expected payment for the different possible reports (assuming
a = 0 and b = 1):
s low medium high
E[pay(medium, s)] 0.1/0.1 0.8/0.5 0.1/0.4
= 1 = 1.6 = 0.25
So the expected payment is highest for a truthfully reporting
the pollution level to be medium.
B. Example of Non-Truthful/Helpful Reports
We now look at the situation one hour later (t2=19:00)
and agent S1 is making measurements on the side street
(R1). The current public map of the pollution levels has a
different distribution. At the same time, agent S1 might know
that a moderate trafﬁc jam has just developed on the main
road, and that winds blow the pollution into the side street.
Consequently, her private belief about the pollution value
became skewed to the higher value.
low medium high
RR1,t2 0.7 0.1 0.2
PrR1,t2 0.3 0.35 0.35
Subsequently, S1 measures the level to be high, and gets
the following posterior:
o low medium high
PrR1,t2high 0.1 0.4 0.5
1) Peer prediction with quadratic scoring rule: Using the
assumption about the agent’s posterior belief given above, the
center computes the following assumed posterior probability
distributions for each reported value s:
s low medium high
Pˆ r
R1,t2
low 0.78 0.07 0.15
Pˆ r
R1,t2
medium 0.66 0.14 0.19
Pˆ r
R1,t2
high 0.64 0.09 0.27
Using its true posterior distribution, the agent can now
compute the expected reward when reporting the different
values, given by the probability that the reported value matches
the model times the reward that would result in that case:
s E[pay(s)]
low 0.1 · (2 · 0.78− 0.782 − 0.072 − 0.152) = 0.092
medium 0.4 · (2 · 0.14− 0.662 − 0.142 − 0.192) = −0.085
high 0.5 · (2 · 0.27− 0.642 − 0.092 − 0.272) = 0.025
and so non-truthfully reporting low give the highest payoff.
Note that the scoring rule is not truthful because the posterior
distribution assumed by the center is very different from the
agent’s true distribution. Note also that this non-truthful report,
if taken into account by the center, will make the public map
diverge even more from the truth.
2) Peer Truth Serum: S1 believes that other agents, for
example S2 or S5, would also report much higher pollution
levels, and assumes the reference value predicted by the model
to follow this posterior distribution, to obtain the expected
payments:
s low medium high
E[pay(high, s)] 0.1/0.7 0.4/0.1 0.5/0.2
= 0.143 = 4 = 2.5
So in this case the highest expected payment is for the agent
to report medium. Although this is not the truthful report, we
have shown in section IV-B that it is nevertheless a helpful
report, which drives the public map closer to the agent’s private
beliefs. When the two coincide, reporting the truth will become
the best policy.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
For the Internet of Things to grow to large scale, it needs
to develop mechanisms to self-organize in the presence of
multiple self-interested agents controlling the devices. For
sensor networks, this next step is community sensing[7], [1],
where sensors are operated by individuals that feed their
measurements into a common network.
We proposed the Peer Truth Serum, an incentive mechanism
for a community sensing scenario that rewards accurate and
truthful measurements as well as providing information that
updates the public model. It is the ﬁrst mechanism that does
not need to make strong assumptions about the agents’ prior
beliefs or updating mechanism, and is thus realistic for a
practical setting. After an initial adaptation phase where agents
adjust their private beliefs and the publicly available map, the
incentive scheme motivates agents to contribute truthful and
accurate measurements. It thus provides the necessary quality
control to ensure that the result of the community sensor
network are valid in spite of the absence of explicit control.
[11] have shown a way to use truthful information elicitation
based on scoring rules as reputation feedback that can adjust
the inﬂuence of raters to their credibility. A similar approach
could be used to adjust the inﬂuence of sensors to their
accuracy and thus use the reward scheme as a reputation
system. Such a reputation system could provide much stronger
quality control, including guarding against reports that are
intentionally false.
While the mechanism ensures that agent beliefs will con-
verge to a common value even when they start out from very
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different values, in community sensing agents observe the
same local phenomena and should have similar prior beliefs
(even these are unknown to the center). For example, if some
area experiences pollution due to ﬁres, this will be apparent to
agents in the area, although it would not be to the center. We
therefore expect that the mechanism will quickly converge to
the truthful reporting regime, while still being robust to new
agents that may not share the prior beliefs.
Other issues that have been of concern in other applications
of truthful elicitation mechanisms are less of a concern in our
setting. In particular, collusion among agents that measure in
related locations is not very likely, as measurements are not
anonymous as for example in product rating. Also, strategic
timing of reports is unlikely as pollution values change in ways
that are hard to predict.
An important open issue is that besides encouraging agents
to report accurate measurements, we also want them to provide
measurements that improve the map as much as possible. [9]
addresses this problem in the framework of scoring rules.
However, in their framework, sensing is driven by requests
of the center who may not be aware of where additional
measurements are needed. In future work, we plan to develop
a similar framework that is driven by the community itself, so
that agents are incentivized to provide the measurements that
they believe will provide the most information to the map.
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